

SOCIAL SCIENCES

NATIONAL REVIEW

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January 5, 1957

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

It's Still the Soviet Party

RALPH DE TOLEDANO

The U.S. Fills a Vacuum

F. A. VOIGT

Are Communists Rational?

GERHART NIEMEYER

Articles and Reviews by JOHN ABBOT CLARK
W. H. PETERSON · SAM M. JONES · WILLMOORE KENDALL
RUSSELL KIRK · L. BRENT BOZELL · VAN GALBRAITH

R 13 Jan 22 '57

For the Record

The Senate picture is still far from clear if we bear in mind the fact that Rhode Island's senior senator, Theodore Green, is 89 years old and West Virginia's Neely and New Mexico's Chavez—both Democrats—are reported in uncertain health. The significance of this is that all three states will have Republican governors in 1957—and the GOP needs to win only one additional Senate seat to win control of the upper chamber.

Thomas Wailes, the U.S. Minister to Hungary, has failed so far to present his credentials to the Hungarian Government, reportedly because he refuses to go through a ring of Soviet tanks to reach the foreign ministry. . . . Five Russian soldiers were reported killed in a mutiny in northeastern Hungary a fortnight ago when they refused to fire on a Hungarian mob. . . . By Christmas, 150,000 Hungarians had fled the country—1.6 per cent of Hungary's total population.

According to the NAM, non-security spending by the federal government will have jumped \$5 billion—or 20 per cent—in the 1955-1957 period, despite President Eisenhower's 1952 campaign pledge to cut government expenditures. . . . The steel industry must spend one billion dollars a year for the next five years to replace wornout and obsolete equipment, says the American Iron and Steel Institute, presaging new price hikes in that basic industry. . . . Compensation of top corporate executives rose 5.9 per cent this year—exactly paralleling the increase in weekly earnings of factory workers.

Prime Minister Suhrawardy of Pakistan says Egypt's claim to be the spokesman for the Afro-Asian nations has done more harm than good to the Moslem world. He is bitterly critical of Colonel Nasser's flirtation with the Soviet Union. . . . Nasser's actions have also been assailed in recent weeks by Premier Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and, of course, by the government of Iraq. . . . Total Anglo-French casualties in the 48-day invasion of Egypt now are estimated at 30 killed, 14 wounded and two missing. . . . Israel claims it captured sufficient supplies of gasoline in the Sinai Peninsula to supply a 60,000 to 80,000 man army for several months.

As of March 1, shipping rates from the East Coast to Mediterranean points will jump sharply (in some cases they will be almost double) as shippers strive to offset increased operating costs due to war bonuses to crews, war risk insurance, and congested ports. . . . Over nine million barrels of U.S. crude oil have been shipped to Europe in the past six weeks. . . . The National Petroleum Institute predicts that America's tanker fleet will be doubled in the next five years.

West Germany continues to boom. Employment was up 900,000 in 1956, or 5.4 per cent, and industrial production was increased by 10 per cent. On January 1, the rich Saar Valley, with its 1,000,000 people and its rich coal and steel industry, was reunited with West Germany. . . . The German automobile industry continues to outstrip its European competitors. The sale of the Volkswagen in this country alone is expected to reach a yearly volume of 50,000 in 1957.

The Agriculture Department predicts the 1956 cotton crop will total 3.3 billion bales, smallest since 1950. . . . Plantings in 1957 are expected to be slashed sharply, with acreage seeding to 59 major crops dipping below the 325 million acre mark—the lowest in 27 years. . . . To entice reluctant farmers into the soil bank program, payments will be sharply hiked. For instance, it is estimated that a farmer will receive twenty dollars for taking an acre of wheat land out of production in 1957, as against eight dollars in 1956.

New York Liberals have found a way of demonstrating their loyalty to Charlie Chaplin. They plan to make overnight and week-end trips to Canada to see Chaplin's new film, A King in New York, which will not be shown in the United States.

Of interest: a pamphlet by Miss Rosalie Gordon, John T. Flynn's research assistant, on collectivist indoctrination in the public schools. It can be obtained for 25 cents at America's Future, Inc., 542 Main Street, New Rochelle, N.Y.

NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

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The WEEK

● All socialist economies are and forever will be in trouble: hence it is no surprise that the Soviet Union, which in addition to practicing socialism diverts an immense amount of its resources to warring, is being tormented by the pestiferous little gremlins which feast on societies that overrule the market place and deny the freedom of property. The bureaucratic shakeup last week, and the admonitions by the Central Committee against "straining" Soviet resources, merely confirm numerous empirical observations and deductive analyses, all of them pointing to the fragility of Soviet economic health. Early last year, NATIONAL REVIEW published an extended analysis of the Soviet economy by an anonymous expert (we dubbed him "Pyrrho") who persuasively contended that we have grossly overestimated Soviet productivity. As never before, it is urgent that the West apply economic sanctions against the enemy.

● Our UN delegation has committed the United States to paying one-third of the tens of millions of dollars it is going to cost to clear the Suez Canal. Presumably the President or the Department of State or somebody authorized the action. But who—since this is clearly an appropriation, and since it says in the book that only the Congress can appropriate money—authorized them to authorize it? The Supreme Court?

● How badly has the Hungarian massacre hurt West European Communist parties? Everywhere there have been defections, notably among the intellectuals. But there was a corresponding closing of ranks at the center. Palmiro Togliatti, who supports the Soviet policy in Hungary, was unanimously re-elected Italian Party chief, and with increased power to boot. Certainly the faithful are finding the Hungarian affair easier to swallow than the Hitler-Stalin Pact, which—although it, too, caused defections—was ultimately digested. With Moscow-line Communists still firmly entrenched, the remaining question is: how strong are the parties they control?

● A reader wrote her Congressman one of those can't-we-do-anything-about-Hungary letters to which she got the following reply. "Dear—: This will acknowledge your letter . . . and your comments regarding the recent anti-Communistic uprising in Hungary. The President, in several speeches within the past week, very aptly described our role in the forthcoming events of not only Hungary, but also Poland and any other satellite nations that take similar action against their Communist masters. As

you may be aware, the President has announced that as soon as these free governments are definitely established, we will grant them economic aid, which is so badly needed in those countries. In his policy of striving to keep the peace, the President has no intention of sending any American troops or naval forces to these countries. As a matter of fact, both Poland and Hungary have stated that they are not in need of military aid but rather their problem is one of economic and material advantage . . . I am indeed grateful for your interest . . . Sincerely yours,
_____. Let us pray.

● Our old pal Clayton Fritchey, Esquire, has quit as editor of the *Democratic Digest* and deputy chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Mr. Fritchey, you may recall, got took for scads of money a couple of years ago by Paul Hughes, the confidence man who made a high living in Washington by furnishing Fritchey *et al* with bogus accounts of Senator McCarthy's juicy undercover iniquities. Mr. Fritchey came within seven million votes last November of replacing James Hagerty at the White House, having been signed on by Adlai Stevenson as press chief last summer. Mr. Fritchey is now looking for a "new journalistic enterprise." At the moment he may be listening ga-ga to Paul Hughes' recounting of the alluring prospects for *Collier's Magazine*.

● The Federal Power Commission has, with admirable propriety, rejected as beyond its jurisdiction the proposal of the New York State Power Commission to go ahead with state, instead of private, development of the Niagara power plant that is to be built in connection with the completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The issue will now be pressed in the courts and in the new Congress. All citizens who wish to keep this great new project out of the blighting, bureaucratic hands of government will do well to urge their Congressmen to complete the action, three times half-carried through, that will authorize development by free (and tax-paying) private enterprise.

● Again demonstrating the political unreality of the supposedly independent and unified Indonesia to which we donate millions of dollars monthly, the former guerrilla leader, Lieut. Colonel Achmed Husein, has engineered a sudden coup in Central Sumatra. Colonel Malaudin Simbolon, the military commander of the area, richest in the archipelago, has been declared political chief. The action—denounced by President Sukarno's Communist associates as Western inspired—was a response to the political and economic anarchy that has been the permanent condition of these regions since the Dutch were, with American assistance, shoved out. The govern-

ment of Premier Sastroamidjojo, unable to meet the challenge, was in immediate danger of collapse.

● We have reports from Washington that friends of the President are pressuring him to intervene in several 1958 primaries that will involve senators suspect of unorthodoxy toward the New Republicanism—notwithstanding the fact that such purges have in the past tended to strengthen rather than weaken the intended victim's chances. Others are urging the President, in the name of party harmony, not to do it, and urging conservative senators, by the same token, to behave. As for us, we'd like a little *dis*-harmony, and are happy to wish the prospective purgees (Goldwater, Jenner, McCarthy, Bricker, Malone, Bridges, Knowland, *et al*) a Rambunctious New Year.

● Over the past ten days reports of unrest in the Soviet Union proper as well as in the satellite areas have come in from many sources in Europe, including recently returned visitors, and from Washington. Most of the reports deal with manifestations by students, intellectuals and industrial workers, and some indirect confirmation of trouble, particularly from "undisciplined" students, is appearing in the Soviet press. The *New York Herald Tribune* has been giving this material especially prominent play, and has published a feature article insisting that the Soviet Presidium is divided by a factional struggle so bitter that it may develop into a drastic new purge.

● In a move that marks a significant further stage in the Soviet penetration of Syria, a Syrian military court has indicted 47 prominent military and political figures for an alleged revolutionary plot to establish a pro-Iraqi (*i.e.*, pro-Western) regime. The defendants, some of whom have escaped to Lebanon, include many of those Syrians who have been opposed to the rapid drift toward the Kremlin of Premier Sabri el-Assabi's government under the influence of the pro-Soviet Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Abdel Hammid Serraj. The Premier meanwhile has resigned in order to form a "more active and harmonious" new government.

● Members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, reporting back to union headquarters in Philadelphia recently after picketing the non-organized Whiting Patterson Paper Company, were faced with a Dilemma to beat all dilemmas. Was it proper for them—good union men that they are—to break the picket line raised by Whiting Patterson employees in protest against the Teamsters' organizing methods? Mrs. Roosevelt has writ that one should not cross a picket line under *any* circumstance. Well, this is a circumstance, isn't it? Eh?

The Eagle as Dove

In the Suez affair the President has had his way. The aggressors are cast into outer darkness: with Britain and France fleeing into the ocean, and Israel back through the desert sands. Small, underdeveloped nations have had their lollipops. The UN credo has been intoned with more than Nicene fervor. "Resort to force" has been duly anathematized, and "international morality" lifted to a positively ionospheric level. Since these were the proclaimed goals of the Eisenhower-Dulles policy, and since they have all been decisively achieved, the two deserve hosannahs.

There are, to be sure, one or two residual problems, to the solution of which, one may be confident, they will direct the attention of their subordinates. The Canal isn't open yet, and Nasser insists on clearing it according to his own rules, which rules are unsatisfactory to about everybody else. There is no agreement on how the Canal's operation is to be supervised, how free passage is to be guaranteed to all nations, how the expropriated Canal Company is to be paid, or how the UN resolution of November 2 is to be put into effect against Nasser's refusal to accept its terms. Israel and the Arab nations are still in a state of war, and no nearer a settlement than three or thirty months ago. The pipeline through Syria is still blown up, and Syria has not even admitted Western engineers to inspect the damage. Moscow continues to press deeper into the Middle East through both Egypt and Syria. Pro-Western Iraq and the Baghdad Pact are under heavy political attack, unsupported by Western counter-measures.

But let us not carp. In major matters we have triumphed. We have got the aggressors, England and France, out of Egypt; we have, moreover, subdued and humiliated them. It is highly unlikely that they will soon again threaten the peace of the world, or stretch out the long arm of imperialism against defenseless and peace-loving peoples.

President Hammarskjold

As a not altogether disinterested observer of the progress of world government, NATIONAL REVIEW casts an occasional eye at what might be called the constitutional development of the UN. A few weeks ago we commented on certain juridical features of the UN army that now serves Egypt at the summons of a General Assembly in which the United States has one, and only one, vote. We now pause to reflect on the role assumed during the Suez crisis by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.

According to the UN Charter (Chapter XV, Articles 97-100) the Secretary-General is a purely "administrative officer." He is not an "executive." He

has no powers, other than to appoint a staff "under regulations established by the General Assembly"; and he has no political powers whatever.

Whence, therefore, did Mr. Hammarskjold acquire the authority to condemn Britain, France and Israel —before the Security Council or the Assembly had spoken—as "aggressors," or to accept Egyptian views on the role of the UN police force and the problem of Canal clearance that were never voted by the Assembly and were in some instances counter to the officially adopted resolution of November 2?

. . . Let No Dog Bark

A letter that appeared in the *Washington Post* recently, signed by one Nostradamus, sheds a merciless beam of light on the pretensions of one of the greatest phonies of our time. Here we go:

As a long time reader, I must confess that one of the most fascinating features of your valuable newspaper is the daily column of that well-known non-partisan, temperate, objective, fair-minded political analyst, Drew Pearson—often characterized as consistently getting as high as 85 per cent on his "predictions of things to come." The recent election and Mr. Pearson's remarkable forecast about the closeness of the result, especially the "doubtful" states, moved me to check back in my scrapbook on one of his columns published on Jan. 1, 1956, of things to happen in this year, now drawing towards its close. Here's what Mr. Pearson predicted:

Adenauer out in Germany. Eden out in Great Britain on account of illness. Red China kept out of the UN but attacking and capturing the Matsus last spring. A nation-wide depression in the last half of '56. President Eisenhower dusting off the old New Deal PWA pump-priming formula to ease this 1956 business slump.

The following seven new laws were to have been passed by the last Congress: 1) a 90 per cent parity farm price law; 2) a small low income tax cut; 3) Immigration Act amendment; 4) Civil Rights legislation; 5) new Federal dams in the Northwest, but only over "terrific" utility lobby opposition; 6) a Federal-aid highway program, to be financed out of the current budget; 7) Federal aid to schools, thanks to heroic last ditch intervention by House Speaker Rayburn.

On the national scene scandals were predicted for both parties, including the FCC and threatened impeachment of former Interior Secretary McKay. President Eisenhower was to have announced last winter that he would not run for re-election. A Stevenson-Kefauver ticket was picked for the Democrats—thanks to Harry Truman's influence! Khrushchev and Bulganin were slated to continue globe trotting, making friends for the USSR. There was to be no war, but some progress on banning hydrogen weapons.

Checking back on these items, which included

everything in that particular column, mind you, not just the hits or misses, I think Mr. Pearson has already reached his quota of 85 per cent. . . .

So, please keep publishing Pearson, Mr. Editor. And please keep publishing him on your comic page. He is so much funnier than all the rest. As to that series on Pearson now running in another famous publication, it seems to me your esteemed contemporary misses the point. To paraphrase that old vaudeville joke—it isn't so much a question of who called that political prophet a so-and-so; the real point is who called that so-and-so a political prophet!

Washington

NOSTRADAMUS

Foreign Aid for Free

Spain—as no reader of J. Dervin's recent article in NATIONAL REVIEW will be surprised to learn—has reached a point where she must seek a large foreign loan or resign herself to economic disaster. To the long-term problems Dervin discussed—chronic under-capitalization, scant natural resources, shortages of skilled labor and technicians—has been added that of a major crop-shortage, which has in its turn produced an increasingly unfavorable balance of trade. Spain's need is genuine, great, and urgent.

As NATIONAL REVIEW's readers know, we have little patience with the whole business of foreign aid, and would prefer to see Spain borrow the money she requires from private capitalists—at whatever rate of interest the riskiness of the loan might warrant. But the U.S., it seems, is in the foreign aid business these days; the best we can hope for is not the cessation of U.S. largesse, but its distribution with an eye to our real national interest and, above all, to those of our alliances that have a genuine bearing upon our security. Our alliance with Spain does have; and we know, furthermore, how we can give Spain the 30 millions she is asking for without—in a manner of speaking—its costing us a cent. How? By stopping aid over the next year to Bolivia, useless as an ally and governed by a leftist dictatorship which has expropriated American capital, and sending the funds earmarked for it to Madrid.

Food for the Hungry . . .

For all the "oceans of printed tears" over Hungary, we noted recently, only NATIONAL REVIEW has seriously proposed free world counter-action. And the only concrete suggestion we have seen as to the form such action might take short of war comes, significantly, from a NATIONAL REVIEW reader. Why not, he asks, a UN air-drop of food, blankets, medical supplies and clothing to the Hungarians—as a reaffirmation of

our "sympathy with the legitimate aspirations of the Hungarian people"?

The planes, Mr. John Phillips thinks, should be unarmed, and clearly marked with UN insignia; and while much of their cargo would have to be parachuted into populous places, he would have large numbers of light packages dropped near villages. Never mind, he says, some of the supplies falling into the hands of the occupying Soviet forces and Hungarian authorities; enough would go to the people who desperately need them to enable us to get our point across.

The Soviet Union might, he agrees, call this intervention in its affairs. But it would have to fire on unarmed UN aircraft in order to do anything about it; and that would be poor propaganda.

"If Soviet divisions," he concludes, "can enter Hungary from the east with death without risking the action of the world, the world can enter from the west by air with food without risking action by the Soviets. Otherwise the world declares itself to be at the mercy of its criminals, prevented from taking normal action by fear of what they may do. If the Soviets should decide to reply, then let this be the time and the place and the issue—and let it be clear that she attacks the world . . ."

Caught in Between

The dangers inherent in the AFL-CIO merger were always obvious, but it was generally supposed that there would arise from it a compensating benefit or two. Certainly there was reason to hope for an end to warfare between craft (AFL) and industrial (CIO) unions, warfare waged by jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts, whose first victim is the innocent employer.

The Burt Manufacturing Company, of Akron, Ohio, makes ventilating equipment. Its life, at this writing, is threatened by such a boycott. In 1945, Burt production employees were organized by the CIO's United Steel Workers. The AFL, which had been attempting to draw the workers into their organization, retaliated by imposing a boycott of Burt products. That boycott cost Burt, in the first decade, millions of dollars. In 1955, company officials greeted the union merger exultantly, for it promised that "each affiliate shall respect the established bargaining relationships of every other affiliate."

But the organizational marriage never shed its blessings on the Burt Company. Rather, the boycott was intensified, so effectively as to threaten the solvency of the company. Sheet metal workers refuse to handle Burt products, and won't work for companies that do. The rumor goes out that Burt is a "non-union" shop. Contractors are advised that work

will go forward more "smoothly" if they refrain from using Burt products. And so on.

What can management do about it? Surrender? How? It can't deliver its employees to the AFL union against their will. The issue, in short, can only be resolved by the two unions, by the "unified" AFL-CIO itself. Yet Mr. David McDonald, president of the steelworkers, refuses even to comment on the Burt situation. If labor will not settle the problem, who will? And when?

When Congress gets down to revising the Taft-Hartley law it should sharpen the provisions intended to outlaw jurisdictional and secondary boycotts. It would be nice if it got around to it before Burt is bankrupt.

Wait and See

The proposals outlined by Mr. Burnham last week, carrying further the analysis of his column of November 17, will have struck NATIONAL REVIEW readers as surprising, to say the least. Over the years Mr. Burnham, along with almost every observer dedicated to a policy of liberation, has looked to a re-armed Germany as the single serious military deterrent (after American airpower) to a westward expansion of the Soviet empire in Europe.

Now he calls on the West for singleminded concentration on an objective—the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central and Eastern Europe—that cannot be effected if West Germany is armed. Very well then, says Mr. Burnham: disarm her, if necessary.

There is no reason to reiterate here the reasons advanced by Mr. Burnham for this change in tactical conception. He gives his reasons, succinctly and fervently. He believes that ferment within the Soviet behemoth has loosed forces that we can hope to turn against Moscow if we take certain measures. Let us, he advocates, withdraw from Germany provided the Soviet army withdraws from Central and Eastern Europe. Let us, as a part of the deal, guarantee the new eastern frontier against the reintroduction of Soviet troops under any guise. These proposals, he is careful to stipulate, are not ideal: he would not urge them on a different set of leaders. For a West guided by resolute, informed men, unfettered by Liberal-pacifist abstractions, he would recommend other things. These, rather, are proposals that the men who in fact lead the West might conceivably give sympathetic attention to and which, for all their drawbacks, have, Mr. Burnham believes, net merit.

Does NATIONAL REVIEW buy the proposal? Certainly not on the strength of what we have heard to date. But we shall not close our minds on the subject. We shall encourage serious discussion of the proposal

in future issues, beginning with a more extended development by Mr. Burnham of his plan. Such a discussion will surely be fruitful, for it will be a discussion of means between men who share the relevant fundamental assumptions: that coexistence is immoral, undesirable, and, in the long run, impossible; that we are dealing with an implacable enemy whose revolutionary fervor burns as hot as ever, and whose designs on the men of the West, and their institutions, remain the same.

Up to Now . . .

"Up to now," wrote Pope Pius in his Christmas message, "we . . . have avoided calling Christendom to a crusade." The "up to now" is heavy with the implication that present trends, if they continue, may lead to a situation in which believers must choose between abdicating on their beliefs and carrying the battle on behalf of those beliefs into the territory of the enemy. No sensitive reader will follow the Pope through to the end of his Christmas meditations without sensing—and sharing—his profound disturbance at what he sees as he looks out over the world. Nor will any thoughtful reader fail to admire the eloquence and incisiveness with which he states the issue that will divide the crusaders, if and when they form ranks, from their adversaries.

"Something," Pius XII declared, "is not proceeding aright in the internal scheme of modern life; an essential error must be sapping its foundation . . ." That error he identifies as the "deep cleavage between life and Christian belief."

What is "necessary, above all else, is to cure this evil." Those who call, instead, for a "revision" of our values are "self-styled realists [who] wish to put themselves in the plan of the Creator and make themselves arbiters of creation." Against them we must display "unanimous and courageous behavior." We shall be succored by the "mysterious brightness which shone forth on the holy night from the humble manger of the Son of Mary, and the chorus of angels announcing peace." These are "renewing, for men of today who have been deluded by so many false hopes, the divine invitation to seek clearness of vision in the mystery of God, and in His love, true life."

Everyone knows of Robert Harriss' yeoman service over the years to the anti-Communist cause in general; not so many know of his activities in connection with the particular anti-Communist cause that bears the proud name "Poland," in recognition of which the Polish Government-in-Exile has lately awarded him the Gold Cross of Merit. NATIONAL REVIEW congratulates Mr. Harriss on this high honor.

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

The Kremlin's Hawaiian Fief

The *New York Times* had it all figured out. "The real purpose of the Eastland Committee's investigation of Communist activity in Hawaii, the *Times* editorialized a couple of days before the hearings began, "is to build up sentiment in the new Congress against another [Hawaii] statehood bill." This "for the very simple reason" that Hawaiian representation in the Senate "would undoubtedly mean two more votes against the segregationist policy typified by Mr. Eastland and his kind."

Baited by precisely that line from the powerful, Communist-dominated International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union, the principal target of the committee's inquiry, Hawaiians themselves had entertained some misgivings about the hearings—notwithstanding an acute awareness of the economic and political power wielded by Harry Bridges and his small band of ILWU lieutenants. But by the time the hearings had run their course, Hawaiians had come to appreciate the value of the spotlight—and the competence and conscientiousness of the Eastland Committee. The *Hawaii Star Bulletin*, which in the past had turned its wrath on Senator Eastland for suggesting that Communist influence in the Islands made statehood inadvisable, handed down a typical verdict:

Most people in Hawaii will give to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security a hearty "Well done!" . . . With its able counsel, Robert Morris, and its staff . . . the committee has unearthed and spread on the record a vast amount of useful information . . . [concerning] the extent, influence and menace of Communism in Hawaii . . . Perhaps the greatest service of the . . . Eastland Committee is that it has revealed to the people of Hawaii a considerable number of ILWU members seeking the shelter of the Fifth Amendment . . .

Ironclad Communist control of the ILWU and of the United Public Workers (the ILWU's little brother

which is organizing territorial government workers) is one of the things that was put beyond any peradventure of doubt by the committee's inquiry. Some of the facts about the ILWU were generally known before—for example, that only legal technicalities have prevented its President, Harry Bridges, from being deported from the U.S. long ago for denying, in taking his naturalization oath, that he was a Communist; and that the ILWU was expelled from the CIO in 1950 as Communist-dominated. Some of the facts were not so well known. For example, that its Secretary-Treasurer, Louis Goldblatt, was expelled by the British Government as an "international Communist agent" while stopping off in London in 1950 en route to a convention of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Marseilles.

For Hawaiians, however, interest centered on the ILWU's unit in Hawaii, Local 142. The President of Local 142, Jack Hall, was convicted by a federal grand jury in 1953 of violating the Smith Act. Today, three and a half years later, the case is still on appeal and Hall continues to manage the affairs of the union—a fact that brought biting comments from members of the Eastland Committee about the sluggishness of the judicial

process. But 142's President, it turned out, is merely part of a pattern. One after the other, the Local's leaders were called before the committee—Newton Miyagi, the Secretary-Treasurer, Robert McIlrath, the educational director, David Thompson, the chief representative on Kauai and Maui islands, as well as twelve other top officials. In each case, the committee confronted the witness with detailed evidence of Communist Party membership, such as attendance at specific cell and branch meetings. In each case, the witness took cover behind the Fifth Amendment.


Communist domination of the ILWU, however, is only half the picture unfolded. Even more significant, the committee demonstrated, is the extent to which the ILWU, in turn, dominates the economic and political life of the Hawaiian community. Bridges' stranglehold on Hawaii's economy is nearly absolute. The ILWU controls the docks and thus is in a position to bottle up, at its whim, the ocean-borne commerce upon which Hawaii so greatly depends. Not only that; the ILWU, curiously, is also the representative of the Islands' sugar and pineapple plantation workers and thus dominates all of Hawaii's major industries.

This kind of economic power has brought its inevitable reward: the obeisance of many Hawaiian business and political leaders. Harry Bridges and his lieutenants wield the sort of influence on the non-union elements of the community that Walter Reuther is surely driving at on the Mainland, but for the moment can only envy. As witness, among others, these facts:

—that a number of testimonial dinners given over the past year in honor of Jack Hall (who, let us recall, had been convicted under the Smith Act) were attended by representatives of industry and management, as well as the Territorial Attorney General and members of the Territorial legislature;

—that in 1955 the Speaker of the Territorial House of Representatives sent his gavel to the ILWU Convention in Long Beach, via Local 142's Secretary-Treasurer (an identified Communist) where it was presented to Harry Bridges; the symbolic sig-

(Cont'd on p. 12)



"Gentlemen, I have absolutely nothing to conceal."



from WASHINGTON straight

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

85th Congress—A Preview

In the short time between November and January the bipartisan congressional opposition, "bloody but unbowed," has been quietly recuperating in preparation for the legislative battles of 1957. The weakness of this opposition lies in the fact that it is a part-time coalition of Democrats and Republicans, not a solid front. When its members see eye to eye, they will be strong enough to kill or emasculate Administration proposals, but such agreement is likely to be a rare rather than a common occurrence. Most of the Eisenhower program will probably be enacted, although much of it, as passed by the Congress, may bear no very close resemblance to the original White House recommendations.

Not all of the fights will involve Administration proposals. The first battle on the unofficial agenda—the attempt to ban the filibuster by amending the rules of the Senate—is sponsored by Liberal Democrats with the active or tacit approval of many Eisenhower Republicans. As a device to clear the way for civil rights legislation, it also has the vigorous support of the NAACP; but even its foremost proponents expect to lose this battle. This does not mean, however, that the drive for civil rights legislation will be abandoned or that there are no parliamentary and practical possibilities of passing such legislation sometime during the session.

Both parties are committed to federal school aid, and resistance is diminished by the shortage of private credit. If the civil rights issue is not injected, it will probably pass.

The Administration will offer major amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, including the proposals that the President made unsuccessfully in the 84th Congress. Union lobbyists will press their own views of revision. The biggest fight may center on the White House move to supervise union welfare funds.

A renewed drive to "liberalize" the

McCarran-Walter Act is certain, but its chances of success are slight although additional special exemptions for refugees are probable.

Advocates of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii are confident of success in this Congress—as they were in the last. Today their optimism is more justifiable, but statehood is by no means "in the bag." The Bricker Amendment, which had overwhelming Senate support at the time of its original presentation only to be defeated by White House pressures, will be offered in revised form but without—so far at least—any blessing from the President.

The battle for increased postal rates will be renewed, with strong likelihood of success.

There will be no move to pass a natural gas bill unless congressional leaders have assurance that it will not meet the fate of its predecessor—a Presidential veto.

Some fifty million workers will begin paying 2.25 per cent of their earnings in social security taxes. The rate was raised from 2 per cent by the last Congress but did not become effective until January 1. Employers will also share the increased load but will begin paying on a quarterly basis April 1.

Foreign Aid will meet the toughest opposition to date, but no realistic observer believes that Congress will make drastic cuts in the Administration's requests. The Nehru-Eisenhower concord is suspect on Capitol Hill, and the possible visit of Tito (which may have been projected as a trial balloon to test public reaction) has been received with strong disapproval by many members of Congress and a host of their constituents.

There is strong suspicion that Mr. Nehru acted as ambassador without portfolio for Mao Tse-tung's Red regime, and that one of his principal objectives was to persuade Mr. Eisenhower to use his influence in behalf of the Communist Chinese, up to and including a seat in the United Na-

tions, with, of course, the displacement of the Chinese Nationalist government. And let it not be forgotten that Mr. Eisenhower in his every public utterance on the question has invariably qualified his opposition to Red China's admission to the United Nations. He has never "unequivocally" opposed the dumping of the Nationalists in favor of the Reds. President Eisenhower is notoriously receptive to international "solutions."

We may not know until the President informs the Congress whether Nehru "sold" his ideas to Eisenhower, but there are some known facts to consider. First and foremost, the United States Senate can rise above politics and has done so on occasion, to protect the nation on matters of principle. There are enough senators of both parties who will back Senator Knowland's stand against approval of UN recognition of Red China if such action is proposed. There is more than enough "back home" influence of constituents to stiffen the backbones of the legislators who need it.

It is important that the Democratic leaders in Congress have won the showdown with National Chairman Paul Butler on his recently created (and already moribund) advisory committee. Whether he knew it or not, Mr. Butler offered the supreme insult to his congressional colleagues by creating a "supervisory" political agency to formulate legislative programs and policy. Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson rejected the idea so emphatically that there is now no doubt that party policy will be decided on Capitol Hill and not in Libertyville, Illinois, or Hyde Park or Albany, New York.

The over-all relevancy is this: There are many Democrats as well as Republicans who will not sell their birthright for a mess of Liberal advice; therefore the bulwark of congressional independence remains. Even with President Eisenhower's high-minded assistance, Nehru, Tito, et al., will have real trouble moving Trojan horses in on Capitol Hill.

Letter from London

F. A. VOIGT

The U.S. Fills a Vacuum

The post-mortems on French and British intervention in the Israeli-Egyptian war are drawing to a close.

Now that we can begin to appreciate the whole cost—moral and political, as well as financial—it is pertinent to ask: "Was it worth while?"

Let us, for a moment, consider the moral aspect of the matter. For this is the aspect that seems to have weighed most heavily with the public on both sides of the Atlantic.

The best—and perhaps the worst—that can be said about the present British Government is that it is neither particularly competent nor excessively incompetent. It means well by the country and is as respectful of its international obligations as can reasonably be expected.

Its decision to intervene in the war was a bold one, but it was carried out with excessive caution and in excessive fear—not of armed resistance, but of public opinion at home and abroad. The commanders of the French and British forces were reduced to a state of exasperation by the meticulous control which their Governments exercised over all their plans and movements to make sure that as few civilians as possible should be hurt, that the damage should be as small as possible, and the military operations as restricted as possible in space and time.

Dispositions of this sort may be highly ethical, but they may also be very dangerous; for they may increase the casualties among the fighting men and imperil the success of the military operations. Air raids were restricted to Egyptian airfields. Each raid was preceded by a warning that gave civilians time to quit the zones of danger. And only small bombs were used because it was thought better to do too little damage than to do too much.

Nevertheless, when the British public was informed of what was being done, a tornado of moral indignation broke loose (as reported in *NATIONAL REVIEW* of December 1).

The deepest dishonor was imputed, not only to the Government, but to the nation. The following ejaculations are typical of thousands that were uttered or written in Parliament, at public meetings, and in the press: Folly on the grand scale . . . criminal lunacy . . . deep shame . . . hypocrisy . . . gross offense . . . lies . . . outrage . . . and so on.

Summoned before the forum of the United Nations, Great Britain was treated like some fibbing, ink-spilling schoolboy summoned before a board of masters filled with the sense of their own rectitude—a little pained and uneasy, perhaps, on the part of America, but inflated almost to bursting point on the part of the mighty Eurasian power whose iniquity stinks to heaven.

On Monday, December 3, and the three days that followed, the British Government faced its own Parliament. It was subjected to volley upon volley of jeering, sneering verbosity, and peal upon peal of derisive laughter. Everyone with any patriotic feeling was humiliated by the Government's pusillanimity (as it was considered) in agreeing to the withdrawal of the British forces from the Canal Zone. In Parliament, the Opposition was almost riotous with relish.

The ferocity of a Lloyd George or a Clemenceau, or the stern dignity of a Bismarck would have been needed to quell the rabble which drew the whole moral sanction for its hilarity from the spurious cosmopolitan ethic of the Charter of the United Nations. Great Britain has no such men, and in the absence of Sir Anthony Eden it was left to poor Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, to do his honest, unimpressive best.

While measureless in condemnation of the Government's policy, the opposition was unable to suggest any rational alternative. What ought the Government to have done instead of doing what it did? It was Mr. Bevan, the master of ranting windbaggery,

who gave the answer—talk to Egypt, talk to Israel, talk to America, talk in the United Nations, but at all times and in all circumstances talk, talk.

It does not follow that, because the opposition never once produced an alternative policy, not even in retrospect, no alternative policy would have been possible. But if we consider the results of the French and British action, without debating whether other and better results might have been achieved, we are driven to the following conclusions:

It is by virtue of the action which it has so roundly condemned in the Security Council and in the Assembly, that the United Nations has established its agency, the "police force" in the Canal Zone, the most important strategic position of the Middle East. Whatever we may think of the United Nations and of the utility of this "force," the powers which voted against France and Great Britain are responsible for its existence and for its future. And among these powers is America.

Even if we regard the "police force" as nothing more than a sort of totem, it is planted in the most critical and most contested area; and whoever tries to desecrate or remove it is inviting American intervention. (To expect France and Great Britain to intervene all over again is expecting too much after the scolding these two reprobates have received.)

In 1947, Great Britain decided to end her financial aid to Greece. In doing so, she would have handed Greece over to Communist domination—in which case Russia would have become a Mediterranean Power—if not America intervened in accordance with the "Truman Doctrine." And so, by accepting the responsibility for the future of Greece, America became a Mediterranean Power.

And now America, by intervening against France and Great Britain in the UN, is becoming a Middle Eastern Power through the initial medium of the UN "police force." It should not be difficult to formulate America's Middle Eastern policy (which diverges widely from Great Britain's) in a few words and call it the "Eisenhower Doctrine." For the second time a vacuum, comprising a region vital to the security of the Western world, from which Great Britain has withdrawn, is being filled by America.

It's Still the Soviet Party

The CPUSA reflects the general Communist malaise, but it will remain loyal to the Kremlin; and in the meantime its influence and power are growing

The Communist Party USA is down in membership, torn by dissension, and beset by the ideological long knives of its leaders. The proliferation of Party fronts has slowed down. The Jefferson School (of subversive sciences) has shut its doors. The *Daily Worker* occasionally paints Khrushchev with his halo askew.

These facts, the result of the downgrading of Stalin and the Soviet terror in the satellites, are all very true. But they do not warrant the complacent conclusions of the pundits that the Communist Party, as an arm of the Kremlin and a force for evil, is ready for the undertaker. The CPUSA is far from dead. Despite the febrile rhetoric of its current controversies, disciplined activity still continues where it really counts—in the underground apparatus, in the Party's industrial concentrations, and on the infiltration front.

What the pundits see are the surface manifestations of a *malaise* which has struck the Communist world, moving out from the Muscovite center to the smallest cell in Timbuctu. Problems of vast importance occupy the men of the Kremlin, and they are reflected in microcosm in the American Communist Party. When the Soviet Politburo has resolved its differences and arrived at its answers, the CPUSA will fall into line as it always has. The passionate debates will be forgotten, no matter who wins the current struggle—just as they were in 1929 when Stalin ousted the Lovestoneite majority and remade the American Party in his own image. Today, the Kremlin representative may stand behind the arras, but he is no forgotten man.

That the factional fight will decide nothing, however, does not detract from its bitterness. At the moment, the CPUSA is involved in a three-way stretch. Pulling one way is John Gates, editor of the *Daily Worker* and


Spanish war commissar—aided and abetted by such sterling idealists as Steve Nelson, also a Spanish war hatchet-man and more lately the head of the atomic espionage operations at Berkeley, California, and Los Alamos. The Gates group represents what might be called the Titoist wing, although this is something of a simplification. It is plumping for an "independent" Marxist party—to include Earl Browder, deposed but yearning *Fuehrer* of the CPUSA, Norman Thomas (if he can be seduced), and any stray leftists it can gather up, a "mass" party.

Gates is motivated by ambition. He remembers the day when Browder was the darling of the intellectuals

RALPH DE TOLEDANO

and a blast from the Communist Party brought the State Department to heel. His wife has been supplying him with other motive power. She has been saying to some of the stalwarts that she "will be no party to any support of the Soviet butchery of unarmed Hungarian workers."

Tugging against Gates is William Z. Foster's Stalinist faction. Its program, however disguised by jargon, calls for close and submissive relations with Moscow, a monolithic party whose "centralism" eschews free debate, and an end to the dangerous nonsense of "democratization." Somewhere between Gates and Foster, though allied tactically with the Fosterites, is Eugene Dennis, timeserver and hack,



who sees the wave of the future in the dimpled Khrushchev.

So far, Foster has blustered at top echelon meetings, calling Gates a "social democrat" and Browder a "stool pigeon." (Behind his back, Foster's enemies charge that his Stalinism and his support of Egypt against Israel is the result of anti-Semitism, a not unknown quality among Communists.) Gates, on the other hand, has been busily winning over delegates to the Party's national convention. His slogan, lifted from the bourgeoisie, is "Time for a change."

The battles of the leadership have found their counterpart on the unit, section, and district levels, where the hair-pulling and name-calling (with cries of "Drop dead, comrade!") hark back to the early 1920's. This has led to some defections, but not enough to shake the structure of the Party. The cold war, the Smith Act trials, and the fear of FBI penetration had reduced the CPUSA to a hard core of the dedicated, stubborn, or cynical. The Party's strength is somewhere between 18,000 and 20,000—and likely to stay at that figure.

Doctrine of Dispersal

But if the Communists can mourn the decline from the days when they could manipulate one million members and fellow travelers, they can also take a bow for the efficacy with which the reduced membership carries out the Party's mission. In labor, in civic and political organizations, and in the movie-theater-television complex, the comrades are back in force, bringing money and prestige to their cause. Here is how an important trade union official, strategically placed to observe the Communists at work, puts it:

"Sure, there is ideological chaos in the Communist Party. But that's only in the so-called open Party. Recent events have distressed many of the rank-and-file members. But the real Party is still intact. You've got to remember that the CP is a paramilitary organization. It's under attack, so it has resorted to the military doctrine of dispersal. It's harder to put your finger on the Party today. But I'll tell you this much:

"Whole groups from the Commie-controlled U.E. have moved into the 'anti-Communist' I.U.E. and the

Machinists union. The Farm Equipment workers have been taken into the U.A.W. by Walter Reuther. Ben Gold, who made no bones about his Party membership, got out of the Fur Workers, but he's still running it from the sidelines. I'd say the Commies in the labor movement are back almost as strong as when their unions were kicked out of the CIO in 1949. They're not in the top echelons, that's true, but on a shop level they still retain a firm and dangerous hold. As for the political picture—well, everybody said it was a sign of CP weakness when they disbanded the American Labor Party. But they just moved into the Liberal Party, where they're giving us trouble, into the Democratic Party and—don't start looking so smug about it—into the Republican Party."

Infiltration Tactics

Assets of about \$6.5 million, taken from the International Workers Order when it was dissolved by New York State courts, have been poured into children's and adult camps which serve as indoctrination centers and also help to keep Communist and fellow-traveling entertainers employed. The entertainment world, moreover, remains a key source of infection. A leader and active participant in several Liberal groups complained:

"When it comes to Communist infiltration, we're back in the 1930's—or worse. Identified Party members, clear-cut Fifth Amendment cases, and the Party faithful are back in force—on Broadway and specially in the off-Broadway theater. You keep hearing about 'blacklists' of 'dissenters,' of terrorized 'nonconformists,' of actors and directors being prevented from making a living because of some minor political indiscretion. But I keep looking over the casts of plays as they open, and I keep finding the Party names. As a matter of fact, the comrades are strong enough now to force out those with anti-Communist reputations. Worse than that, they have begun to use their influence, as they did in the thirties, to push the uncommitted over to their side.

"Those of us who see this going on are helpless to act or speak up. No matter how liberal we've been, how

much we've fought for civil liberties, we lay ourselves open to the charge of McCarthyism. You know, there's an anti-Communist play, a terrific job, which has been kicking around from producer to producer. They all praise its qualities, but they say that frankly they can't afford to touch it. One producer who tried to go ahead couldn't find a director or actors. Maybe we can get the Fund for the Republic to produce it, like hell!"

The Party felt confident enough to discuss, at a very high level, the possibility of setting up an Alger Hiss Defense Committee. On second, and more canny thought, the Party decided that this might hurt—rather than help—Hiss. But now that Alfred A. Knopf is publishing Hiss' apologia for treason, perhaps the CPUSA will take heart.

NATIONAL TRENDS

(*Cont'd from p. 8*)

nificance of the gesture was not lost on the cheering delegates;

—that the ILWU, only this month, forced the appointment of its close friends to all five of the Democratic and two of the Republican seats on the Labor Committee of the Territorial House of Representatives—the committee that handles virtually all legislation affecting labor;

—that Hawaii's present Delegate-Elect to Congress, Democrat John Burns, ran for office with ILWU support and was "proud" to have it.

It may be that the Eastland investigation has damaged Hawaii's chances of immediate statehood. If so, it will be because Congress is unwilling to admit into the U.S. proper a community that is, to a frightening extent, under the thumb of the Soviet international. Responsible Hawaiians recognize the problem—and also the solution, which is to bust the ILWU. Hawaii's Governor Samuel King made a suggestion to the Eastland Committee: "I hope that, if the facts justify it, the committee will see fit to recommend that [the ILWU] be listed as Communist infiltrated under the Communist Control Act of 1954." Such a step, the Governor argued, would free industry from its obligation under the NLRA to bargain with the ILWU—and that could conceivably break Harry Bridges' back.

Letter from the Continent

E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Exploded Myths

Totally unexpected developments such as the spontaneous Hungarian uprising are destroying many a calculation and speculation. Since religion with the end of World War II had become a dominant political factor in Western Europe and its struggle for survival east of the Iron Curtain a grave problem, the debate about "understanding" between the "Two One Worlds" has become a major issue in Catholic and Protestant circles. On the surface we find the age-old Christian problem of the morality of war. On a somewhat lower level is the question of social justice. There actually have been Christians tempted to collaborate with their Marxist masters in the Red orbit because they have been lulled by the affirmation that peace and social justice are the two primary elements in the Socialist-Communist program. Peace and social justice, so the argument ran, are eminently Christian demands, and thus Christians have a religious and human interest in not being left out of the grandiose work of social and economic reconstruction contemplated by the "Peoples' Democracies." At the same time ecclesiastics of both faiths were jailed, monasteries were closed, religious instruction restricted and all intellectual-cultural work prohibited unless it worked in perfect synchromesh with the intentions of the Red tyrannies.

It is thus by no means surprising that even among Catholics east of the Iron Curtain collaborators could be found who with or without misgivings followed this psychological invitation. The Continental Catholic, it must be borne in mind, does not always keep his ear cocked in the direction of Rome; frequently his attitude is tinged with anti-clericalism. Therefore not even the ugly stage trials of bishops and cardinals were effective in destroying all chances of Catholics accepting advantages offered to them by the Red governments. A number of them undoubtedly also thought that "collaboration"

rather than open resistance was the best method of opposition. It would be most erroneous to think that every Catholic or Protestant signing a "peace petition" was a pro-Communist, a fellow traveller or even an appeaser. Often there is a strategic motive in such apparent surrender.

Still, what happened east of the Iron Curtain caused quite a confusion among the ranks of the faithful in the West. We must not forget that the existence of a Catholic and Protestant Left antedates not only World War Two but even World War One. Socialism, after all, is a "Christian heresy" unthinkable without a Christian prehistory. Yet, as the Romans used to say, "the corruption of something good is the worst thing imaginable," and hence we see the diabolic evolution from the crazily harmless dreams of Charles Fourier to the bestial Arctic concentration camps.

The Christian Left in France, Germany and Italy, needless to say, was slow in recognizing the intrinsic evils of Communism. It never parted entirely with the illusion that socialism (and/or Communism) could be "democratic"; that the persecution of religion in the USSR had to be understood in its "historical context" and that Marxist anti-Christianism was largely based on a "misunderstanding." The Catholic Leftist was always quick to criticize his Church for its allegedly "bourgeois" character, its "betrayal of the workingman" and its archaic efforts to support a "past order" (i.e., free enterprise).

These criticisms, mixed with fears and apprehensions about the Church supposedly misreading the "signs of the time" and being in the danger of "missing the bus," have increased in recent years. And underneath the energetic and vociferous protests of Catholics everywhere in the free West against tyranny in the East, there was always a whispering campaign to the effect that "things aren't that simple." We were told that after ten years of

Soviet occupation and methodical socialist education the younger generation had been "transformed." Christianity east of the Curtain had to "adapt" itself to a "new society." It used to be entirely reactionary in its leadership, but the ex-managers (lay and ecclesiastic) had either fled the country or perished in the process of "social engineering." There was a "new look" to the religious scene in the East and we should not fool ourselves as to the chances of our reactionary appeals. East and West, we were told, should learn from each other; but this statement was usually made with the innuendo that the Wave of the Future belonged to the East rather than to the West.

The Hungarian uprising brutally deprived Western Leftist Christians of a cherished myth. Not reactionary landowners, fat monsignori and retired stockbrokers rushed against Russian tanks waving the national colors, but the workers who supposedly had such a marvellous social security system, the peasants who had allegedly benefited so greatly from land reform and the students who had been systematically exposed year in year out to Marxist indoctrination. All of which shows up the West's craving for illusions and also its lack of faith in its own values, creeds and tenets. Hungary has taught a lesson not only to Moscow but also to certain flabby-minded and muddled Christians in the West.

The tragic outcome of the Budapest uprising stems from the fact that the leaders of the organized Hungarian resistance totally misinterpreted the happenings in Poland which, after all, remain an "inner-Communist" affair. Psychologically the age-old Polish-Hungarian friendship played a fatal role. (Hence also the Warsaw demonstrations before the Hungarian Legation.) The circumstance that the heroic rebellion took place immediately after Imre Nagy, a "Titoist," took over the premiership, will boomerang against Tito and against all and every "Liberalizing" move in the satellite orbit. The uprising certainly was a reminder to the world that Magyars do not want to be slaves, but it remains to be seen whether, in the future, it will serve the cause of a Titoist National Communism or, perhaps, usher in a revival of Stalinism.

The Liberal Line...

WILLMOORE KENDALL

From Budapest to Buchenwald

All the Liberal tributes to the Hungarian freedom fighters, we were saying last week, all the insistence on the "lessons" about the USSR to be learned from recent events in Budapest, all the hints that the Liberal line is moving to a new tough position on World Communism, turn out to be sheer rhetoric. And we agreed to test that statement against the recent editorial performance of the *Reporter* and the *New Republic*.

The one that might fool you is the *Reporter*. Unlike the *Nation* (as we saw it last week), it has had nothing good to say about the Administration's handling of the Hungarian and Suez crises, it has criticized the UN, it has denounced "peace-mongering" in terms that would have seemed bellicose in *NATIONAL REVIEW* itself, and it has gone so far in identifying itself with the Hungarian and Israeli causes that—well, that it is hard to see why the editor's own rhetoric did not sweep him into the new position it clearly points to.

Listen to him, for example, on UN. If, he says in his best vein of sarcasm, we can but "wipe from our eyes the mist of happy tears over this new world aborning," we will recognize the UN emergency forces in Egypt as merely an "urbane, better-mannered substitute for the Russian volunteers." Are they not there precisely to "prevent the Israelis, the British, and the French" from doing a much-needed "housecleaning job"? And he speaks even more strongly about the UN's very different handling of the crisis in Hungary. It issued a declaration, to be sure; but it was "followed by no international army, no UN investigating committee; indeed no one from the UN even peeped into Hungary"; instead we have a display of "cowardice and stupidity" that has made the last weeks "unbearable."

Hear him, again, on the Administration: Its "lingo" is a "pious, unthinking moralism"; what drove Britain and France to do something

"slightly against the still hazy principles of the UN" was its own diplomacy; had it "possessed a minimum of common sense" it would have regarded Britain, France, and Israel as "guilty" not of a "major crime" but a "misdemeanor," and guilty of that "with extenuating circumstances"; the Administration "follows the Russian lead and acts as a Russian satellite"—and it does so out of "high principle," for which it will even be "unmerciful to the allies on whose strength we depend."

And on peacemongering: "The representatives of our government" have "become uncompromising advocates . . . of the no-force doctrine. They are against the use of force anywhere. . . ." And he sees clearly how such a policy aids the USSR, which "uses force, or the threat of force, whenever it feels there is no danger of retaliation on our part"; so that the USSR's answer to our no-force doctrine is: "Force can be used against people who want to gain freedom or who, to defend themselves, want to exercise their freedom."

And, as a final example, on the Hungarians, the Israelis, and Nasser: The Hungarians "have shown us what men can do who are not cowards." The Israelis "tried to use force against an implacable enemy," and—another go at the Administration—"when our oldest and closest allies followed suit . . . [it] made little difference to the Administration that Nasser is an enemy . . ." As for Nasser himself: "Of course we loathe Nasser just as Nasser loathes us."

But when we look about for the indicated follow-through on these fine sentiments, and try to discover what would have been done had the editor of the *Reporter*, not Mr. Eisenhower, presided over the crisis, we are in for a series of disappointments. Would he—since he sees through the no-force doctrine, and heartily dislikes peacemongering—would he have

thrown the armed might of the United States behind Britain and France and Israel? Would he have gone along with *NATIONAL REVIEW* on an ultimatum to the USSR on Hungary? Clearly not, for the trouble with the no-force doctrine turns out to be that "far from achieving world law [which, as duly appears, is what we want]," it has "brought us closer to war [that is, to the use of force] than at any time since 1945." He sees that diplomacy based on the UN is "decided according to the returns of . . . [a] lottery". Would he, then, have broken with UN, and so left the U.S. free to take such action as the situation might require? No, the UN remains "the best hope mankind has for peace." His quarrel, indeed, is not with the organization, or the idea of such an organization, but with its recent policies—and with the Administration for having relied upon it too heavily at too early a moment in its development, for having "smothered" it by "massive" dependence on it, and for having "endangered" it.

By expecting too much of it? No, by pursuing in it a "passive, middle-of-the-road policy"; the *Reporter*, indeed, would have expected far more from it than the Administration did: "It can clean house in Egypt, see to it that the Canal is run in the interest of the international community it was dug out to serve, see to it that the resources of the entire Middle Eastern region are made to profit the peoples of this region . . ."

Like the *Nation*—like Mr. Eisenhower—like the Liberal line everywhere and at all times—the *Reporter* is so much more afraid of atomic war than of Communism that it can not move to a meaningfully tough policy on the USSR—can not escape from that dream world in which atomic war will somehow be prevented, and all other problems somehow solved, by the UN—can not do other than subordinate all other U.S. interests to its putative interest in UN—and can not have any legitimate quarrel, save on questions of detail or rhetorical emphasis, with prevailing U.S. policy. The break will come, if ever it does, on the day when the Liberals get as sore at the Communists as they once were at the Nazis. That is, when they have travelled the distance from Budapest to Buchenwald.

Are Communists Rational?

How good are Western guesses of future Communist actions? No good at all, says Professor Niemeyer of Notre Dame, authority on Communist psychology

GERHART NIEMEYER

Our policymakers, rather than being guided by a correct picture of what is going on in Communist minds, have tended to interpret these minds in our own image. This has induced our statesmen to act in continuous expectation of that turn in Soviet behavior that would finally conform to our image of them. American diplomacy waits and watches until the Soviet leaders take a step; then it reacts.

Soviet conduct departs sufficiently from the means of international intercourse—if not from average human conduct—to raise the question of rationality. Are Soviet policies irrational? What precisely is the mentality from which they flow?

Nazi conduct was generally considered the product of a warped mind. Hence, quite consistently, we classified the Nazis as "dangerous people" who should be "quarantined" or, better still, deprived of the instruments of power with which they could do immeasurable harm. Soviet "intractability" confronts us with a similar problem of interpretation. In much of our public discussion of this question, however, one can observe an inclination to view the Soviet problem differently from that of the Nazis. Soviet intractability is frequently interpreted as resulting not from a warped mind but from historical developments for some of which we are invited to blame ourselves.

This image of the Soviet mentality prompts many to advocate a policy that involves neither "quarantine" nor other precautions usually taken against "dangerous people," but an effort to re-establish rational communications with the Soviet mind and to

remove the circumstances which produced Soviet hostility. It is argued that, if we persist in an honest endeavor to find common ground with the Soviet Union, we will break through the barrier of fear and suspicion now separating us and establish real contact ("understanding") with the Soviet leaders. In short, the assumption that the Soviet mentality is basically rational as we conceive rationality leads to the conclusion that the chief function of our policies should be to overcome "misunderstanding" between the two sides.

Comparison with Nazis

Such arguments derive from the assumption that the Soviet system is basically a rational political system devoted to the pursuit of reasonable social goals. A second and closer look at that system, however, reveals that with regard to precisely those features which in the case of the Nazis were accepted widely as evidence of irrationality, the two systems are more alike than different. The classless society is not a rationally conceived end, but a visionary fancy. The Soviet rulers wield dictatorial power but do not wield it for the sake of a realizable goal.

The question is, not whether a lunatic manages to get to the top in a totalitarian system, but whether a totalitarian system causes the rulers to lose the capacity for obeying reason and to act from whims, passions and fears, rather than rational judgments. Does it make sense when people, *in the name of the good life*, initiate wholesale purges, liquidate entire classes of the population, insist on prescribing the detailed structure of a faraway society, maintain an army of spies, and spies against those spies? Is this not also madness, even madness on a greater scale, compared with which one could say Nero

and Caligula amused themselves but with a game of marbles?

In all the gyrations of Communist theory, certain parts have remained untouched, an inviolate dogma. Significantly, this residue is precisely the irrational element, the "intuition of the future." This vision, temptingly dressed up as a foolproof "scientific" theory, has taken a deep and almost subconscious hold on those who have embraced it in the way of a pseudo-religion. It supplies them with a hope, a task, a notion of life's meaning, a criterion of the elect.

Around it cluster supplementary concepts: the radical difference between the Communist world and all other societies that now are or ever have been; the sanctity of the revolutionary process by which that new world has been born; a "moral" code peculiar to the "elect" and a concurrent denial of all moral ties to the present world. Communists have never sought to reinterpret, adapt, or distort the dogma of history's inexorable movement toward a Communist future involving the end of all non-Communist societies. Rather, they use the future as a steady beam to guide wills and attitudes.

It is this that causes a Khrushchev to lean toward Chancellor Raab of Austria, in the late hours of a drinking party, and give him the friendly advice to become a Communist. It is this that allows Communists to take "one step forward, two steps back" without a sense of defeat, to change not just tactics but even strategy, to court disaster with the sure expectation of eventual gain, and to remain undisturbed by a discrepancy between their analysis of reality.

There develops the psychological tendency among Communists to engage in self-contradictory actions. It is hard for Westerners to grasp that the Kremlin manages to be simultaneously for and against something.

This article has been condensed from Professor Niemeyer's book, "An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality," published by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, and copyrighted 1956 by The Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Moscow, for instance, supported the parties allied with the Communists in the French Popular Front, and at the same time sought to split and weaken them from within. While the Kremlin worked for the downfall of Hitler at Geneva and in the capitals of Western Europe, it also conducted at Berlin negotiations aiming at increasing Nazi strength. Tito in Yugoslavia both fought the Germans and used their help to fight his civil war.

When the men of the Kremlin helped Hitler's rise to power while fighting Fascists and Nazis, or when they mobilized anti-Hitler resistance all over Europe while protecting the Nazis' rear by secret negotiations, Soviet intentions were revealed neither by what was done before everybody's eyes nor by what was perpetrated behind the scenes. In terms of dialectic, it cannot be said that, when the Korean war broke out, the Soviet bloc "really" intended to oppose United Nations action, or that they "really" wanted to promote it. Actually, they both promoted and opposed collective action under the United Nations, aiming to secure a new historical situation that would emerge from the conflict between their policies. The Communists have found out how to eat their cake and have it too.

Even in their own minds the Communists do not see their rule as an implicit mandate of the majority of the people. They are determined to achieve their goal in spite of immeasurable cost in human life, liberty, happiness and dignity—costs which, as their political organization proves, they calculate ahead of time. Communists are therefore required to argue their goal according to one set of terms and to pursue it according to a different set of terms: a situation not favorable for maintaining a proportionality between political ends and the costs of attaining them.

By virtue of their belief in Marxist dogma Communists live in a mental world that is essentially hostile to the mental world of the West. It is an incompatible world because Communists will it to be totally other; and they stake their life on the difference. Like a psychoneurotic person, they are separated from the rest of the world by the exclusiveness of the premises on which their mind operates. If their system has elements

of rationality, it is not only a different but, by dint of the Communist will, an irreconcilably different rationality.

Communists by and large do believe in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, are inspired by its prophecy of ultimate triumph, have confidence in its methods, and accept its commandments. In this sense, the body of ideological doctrine identifies the Communist system for its adherents. No other identification is conceivable. What is more, the doctrine is the justification for this system—the Soviet power structure could not justify itself in any other terms. The "Communist world" is nothing but the society governed by Communist doctrine.

Ideology gives the regime a façade of rationality which helps win the minds of men throughout the world by appeals to "reason" that are as ponderous as they are specious. The constant invocation and reformulation of Communist doctrine in day-by-day operations is not rationality but rationalization. It is indispensable to Communist control over the minds of outsiders, subjects and victims. But a person who rises to the top will sooner or later reach the point where he realizes that he must either make up his mind, accept the incompatible, or cast loose. Once he decides to stay with the inner circle, he must play their game or perish. At this point, irrationality borrowing the mantle of reason stares him in the face. At the highest level, deception of self and others is the price of belonging, as the autobiographical sketches in *The God That Failed* have made clear. Nevertheless, even at the highest level, the Soviet leaders, while willfully manipulating the doctrine, are themselves imbued with Communist thought patterns.

Calculated Soviet Behavior

Do Communist leaders themselves believe their doctrines? On the level of tactical rationalization — e.g., "peaceful coexistence" and "collective leadership"—the ruling Communists probably believe little of what they din into the ears of their subjects and opponents. It would be a great mistake, however, to deduce from this flood of words and slogans that Communists have ceased to believe, or will cease to believe, in the Communist world as such, the world that is

hostile to the rest of the world, that is identified and justified by Communist ideology and cannot be conceived apart from that doctrine.

In view of irrational features both in Soviet doctrine and Soviet society, should all of Soviet conduct be assumed to be irrational? Such an assumption would be both unnecessary and unwarranted.

One occasion which calls for calculated Soviet behavior is the destruction of rival political forces. Perhaps this is so because negation is an attitude to which the Soviet mind reacts in some part, at least within the universe of reasoning. One could almost say the hidden philosophical starting point of Communist thinking is: "I say No, therefore I am."

From its very beginnings, Marxism-Leninism has conceived the relation between itself and the rest of the world as one of destruction. Communists assumed that the relationship must be so understood on both sides, that this must be the one premise shared between the Soviet system and the outside world. For the purpose of active and complete negation, the Communists recognize a universe of common rationality, a world of mutual "understanding" and communication. In the subversive business of destroying social institutions, traditional loyalties, integrity of individuals, indigenous authority, etc., the Communists have shown a remarkable sense of tactics and of timing. They perceive precisely where groups, individuals, institutions or leaders are vulnerable; how they can be deprived of their moral backbone; how any will to resist can be broken through sheer exhaustion.

The following points are clearly established by Communist behavior: First, the Soviet machinery of power (Party, State, World) is geared to use force at any given moment. Second, this machinery is not limited by any inhibition regarding the extent to which force is to be used. Third, the Soviet rulers, even while using force, still regard it as a means to a political end, and as only one means in a total weapons system that always includes non-military weapons; e.g., they do not allow their policies to be governed by military considerations but conceive military action only in terms of political operations employing, for the time, military means.

Hence a war is in Soviet eyes above all a political process. Not even in the blackest days of World War Two did the Soviets allow themselves to feel that all that counted was military victory. Not for a minute did they forget their political objective; and when military and political considerations conflicted with each other, the political prevailed. Thus the Soviets at the hour of great weakness shot almost ten thousand Polish officers who would have fought Germany and thereby added considerable military strength to the Allied side, but who as members of Poland's aristocracy and bourgeoisie were enemies.

"Peace," It's Wonderful

The most ambiguous of Soviet formulae justifying war goes under the name of Peace. During the last few years, the cause of Peace has generally taken the former place of Revolution in Communist propaganda and policy. The ranks of the faithful are now consistently called the "fighters for peace." Nations in the Soviet camp or officially accepted as friendly to the Soviet Union are by definition "peace-loving" nations. The important fact is that the "fight for peace" is officially envisaged as including armed fighting, and "peace-loving" is an official designation even for nations engaged in aggressive hostilities, like the People's Republic of China.

There is, in Soviet foreign relations, no intellectual or emotional basis for reasonableness, as non-Soviet countries understand it. A community of goals or values with outsiders is explicitly rejected by the Communists, even in cases of the most immediate and obvious need.

It is said that the Soviet leaders might become reasonable as their goals change. Yet, why should their goals change, as long as they are rewarded with the successes that have attended their postwar efforts? On the other hand, it is unlikely that they would become more reasonable if the non-Communist world succeeded in preventing further Communist successes. At a time when the Soviet system was advancing very slowly, if at all, it examined and emphatically rejected the "reasonable" versions of Marxism.

Communists are those Marxists who have elected the most uncompromis-

ing variant of the doctrine. Are they, in the future stalemate, to fall back on a position previously branded as heresy and punished by ignominious death? Moreover, what is there to tempt them into a more "reasonable" form of Marxism? The rewards of power and control have so far gone to Communists rather than to Social Democrats. Even when, as in the case of Yugoslavia, extremely strong arguments could be advanced for a milder, less dictatorial, less oppressive form of Communist regime, the advocates of reasonableness (such as Djilas) have been forced into silence. "Reasonable Communism" is a contradiction in terms.

Communication of meaningful signals between the non-Communist world and the Soviet world is extremely difficult. It is difficult for Westerners to grasp the rationale of Soviet conduct, but it is next to impossible for Communists to grasp the purposes of Western policy however explicit it may be in words and deeds. The Communist mind has so defined its world that it shares neither truth nor logic nor morality with the rest of mankind. It believes that history has defined the mutual relationship between Communism and non-Communist societies in terms of an intent to destroy or be destroyed.

If, in evaluating Soviet policies, Westerners attribute to them reasons comparable to their own, they are very probably wide of the mark. If they assume that their own policies and statements on such matters as Containment, Deterrence, and Atomic Retaliation convey the same meaning to Communists as to themselves, they are certain to be mistaken.

Only to the degree that Westerners make themselves students of Marxist-Leninist dogma and develop a flair for dialectic can they be at all confident that they understand Soviet policies. Here the problem for policymakers is to submerge themselves in the vast literature of Communist ideology so as to see things as Communists are likely to see them, and yet emerge with an unimpaired devotion to non-Communist values. Apart from a few ex-Communists, who have regained emotional and intellectual balance, a deep commitment to Western ethics and epistemologies has to date been a barrier to insight into the mind of Commu-

nists. If such commitment continues to be a barrier, misunderstanding of Soviet policies is likely to spread increasingly. In such cases, the "inside view" of Soviet policies will continue to be closed to all but very few and the insights of these very few will not be generally accepted.

What is true of "understanding" as an illusory policy is doubly true of "peace." Peace, in the sense of international order based on a minimum of common values, is not possible with an adversary who rejects the very right of other societies to exist. The Soviet world is too antagonistic to, and different from, any other to facilitate even compromise, much less a more basic adjustment. This antagonism, of course, does not preclude peace in the sense of a truce. A genuine relaxation of world tensions however, cannot be expected as long as Soviet Communism retains its immense base of state power.

It is unwise and unrealistic to base Western policy on the exclusion of any Soviet course of action. The Soviets may decide on a policy that Westerners would consider foolish. They may take a course Westerners would judge suicidal. Policymakers should not rule out the most unlikely—"unreasonable"—developments.

Soviet irrationality stems from deep contradictions in the Soviet system. If the Communists have for many years systematically exploited what they consider "internal contradictions" in capitalistic society, there is no reason why Westerners should not just as systematically start to take advantage of their "inner contradictions." That they exist, few close observers deny. Knowledge of Marxist-Leninist doctrine is still confined to a ridiculously small group of experts. Still smaller is the group who know the fissures in the Soviet structure where a wedge can be driven with the most telling results. It seems almost as if the West has been unable to muster sufficient confidence and courage to attack Soviet morale at its core—Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Those who have put their faith in that doctrine may be immunized to the blandishment of free men's ideas. But precisely because they are dedicated men, they are vulnerable through the many and deep conflicts of reason in which their own ideas are involved.

From the Academy

RUSSELL KIRK

Beaver Island

Away out in northern Lake Michigan lies the island of Big Beaver, thirteen miles long and six to three miles wide, with a population of a few hundred persons, chiefly fishermen: Irish, French-Canadian, and a few Indians. For several months of the year, Beaver Island can be reached safely only by plane—although some of the natives heroically drive their automobiles (with great timbers attached) across the treacherous ice to the mainland of Michigan. The Chippewa and Ottawa came to Big Beaver first; then the *coureurs de bois*; then, in 1847, a Mormon colony under "King" Streng, the only monarch ever to reign in Michigan. Mainland Gentiles slew King Streng in 1856, the Mormons were deported, and Irish fishermen occupied the island. These, with the French and Indians, have been there ever since.

Many things about Big Beaver are interesting; but what interests me just now is the Beaver Island school, which goes all the way from the first grade through the high-school diploma. Originally this was a Catholic school, but it has been incorporated in the public school system, and though most of the teachers still are nuns, there are one or two Protestants on the staff today. It seems to be one of the best school systems in Michigan, though there are only twenty-two students in the high school and perhaps twice that number in the grades. A friend of mine, secretary of a school board on the mainland, is considering sending his son to Big Beaver to complete high school because schooling in Beaver Island still respects intellectual disciplines.

Big Beaver high school offers four years of Latin. United States history is taught in the grades, and American, ancient, medieval, and modern history in the high school. One takes either two years of algebra, or one year of algebra and one of geometry, as a minimum in mathematics. By the eighth grade, the students are ex-

pected to have mastered ratio, proportion, and permutation, not merely simple arithmetic. The parts of speech are treated by definition and usage in the third grade. And the rest of the curriculum corresponds to these requirements. A generation ago, such was the standard curriculum of any decent public school; but now such fidelity to regular studies is exceedingly rare in our progressive land.

Despite the remoteness and poverty of Big Beaver, a considerable number of its graduates go on to college somewhere, and the teachers receive many letters from college professors and administrators remarking on how unusually well Big Beaver young people are prepared for college. One might not expect a population made up of fishermen and hunters and redskins to produce scholars; but such is our topsy-turvy age that Big Beaver probably has more people decently educated than have most fashionable suburbs.

As I mentioned in these pages some weeks ago, the doctrinaire reformers of the Michigan Education Association are intent, just now, upon passing legislation to abolish all rural schools, and to bring local school boards entirely under the thumb of the state superintendent of public instruction, who is properly subservient to the MEA. I doubt not that these gentry detest Big Beaver with heart and soul. How vexatious it must be that something for the mind still is offered in this remote backwater, when Socialization and Adjustments have won the day in the big cities! Well, I think that places like Big Beaver mean to keep decent schools if they possibly can; and it looks as if the MEA is in for a fight.

The friends of rural schools are organizing in Michigan to present their own case to the state legislature. Rural school boards, and even country school superintendents, seem weak and short of money and time

when compared with the bureaucracy of the state office of public instruction and the MEA hierarchy (supported by dues extracted from reluctant teachers throughout the state, by a process close to duress); yet a little resolution still can accomplish marvels. To the surprise of many of us, the MEA was beaten on two schemes last year: its plan for increasing the education-course requirements of teachers and its design to make the office of state superintendent appointive; and though the MEA will no doubt try again, the complacency of its officers has been shaken.

It is true that the state office and the MEA could not abolish the Beaver Island school, for its geographic isolation makes its consolidation with a larger mainland school impossible. So perhaps we shall always have resistance-cells left in such odd corners, if the state authorities are unable to dictate the curriculum completely. But nearly everywhere on the mainland of Michigan, if the latter-day disciples of Dewey have their way, an increasing centralization of policy and plant will be enforced. It will become more and more difficult to hold the line against any folly which enters the head of the MEA hierarchy.

What a paradox it is that, in the midst of our national luxury, we continue deliberately to lower standards of instruction in our school system! In the long run, I feel fairly confident, any people must awake to the damage that has been done to public education, and must attempt to repair that injury. Already the piercing criticisms of the notions of the patronage network of Teachers College, Columbia, which have appeared in a number of vigorous books, are making themselves felt even within the teachers' colleges. But a change of mind and policy at the top, even when achieved, will require years to filter down to the lower levels of our school system.

Our present hope lies in holding the line, wherever we can, until some sense has prevailed in universities and teachers' colleges. In this work, the newly-formed Council for Basic Education may have an important part. Here again is their address, which I published on this page last fall: 208 Union Trust Building, Washington 5, D.C. They welcome inquiries and dues-paying members.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Possum Agonistes

JOHN ABBOT CLARK

A presumptive and presumptuous example of the sort of thing Mr. T. S. Eliot himself may be provoked into doing almost any day now, if books like T. S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays, a Study in Sources and Meaning—in many respects, a work of considerable merit—by Grover Smith, Jr. (338 pp. University of Chicago Press. \$6.00), continue to drop from the presses.

Poet: You don't read them, you don't—but I read them: they are hunting my meanings down, I must move on.—*Claustrophoroi*.

Hence the professor cannot be possessed of the academic accolade, until he has divested himself of the love of created things, like poems.—(This has been traced to St. Louis.)

Between the poem
And the reader
Between the transmutation
And the source
Falls the Gloss
For Thine is the way
(to promotion and pay)
The teacher springs in the sabbatical year. Me he devours.
To be beaten (for hidden allusions),
to be divided (among explicators),
to be shrunk (for dull readers); by
Mr. Scholaro, bowing among the Rajans;
By Professor Hymsatt, sifting the Grail legends, shuttling between his office and the library, one hand on the Taro pack, in quest Of the Objective Correlative.

After such diligence, what forgiveness?

The professor's day
Is spent with sheep; at night he quaffs the cup;

God works in a mysterious way (I swear)—

My poems to clear up.

In verse composed so much of odds and ends,
how keen you are to ferret out the sources
of my inspiration.

You can connect
Everything with everything

So intimate, so intelligent, so eclectic, this Eliot—

I hear them saying. His borrowings should be resurrected only among the members of the Comparative Literature section of the Modern Language Association.

I have seen the members riding eastward in the chair cars

In their yearly meeting place
They gripe together
And avoid thought
Gathered in the Lilac Room
To hear Professor . . . —arrange the scene yourself—
Let me be no nearer

Till student voices wake them, and they frown.

The hope only
Of would-be deans
And audio-visual men

II

O my reader, what I have done unto thee
is as nothing compared to what the Neo-Alexandrians
have done unto me.

I ought never have strayed from Cousin Harriet.
As for *The Waste Land*—let the dead past bury it.

Far better to have been
a simple poet of the plow;
Would God I'd never even heard
of Frazer's *Golden Bough*.

I should have stuck to Practical Cats,
To men in gaiters and shovel hats.

O why did I ever
read Miss Weston,
Either with, or without,
my vest on?

But I ask you, Professor—
Must I borrow every word to find expression?

Do I dare to coin a phrase,
or start a little thought
That's all my own?
If someday I should say:
I wrote this just in play—
It's all in fun,
A harmless pun,
And really not so fey.

But those are useless questions.

I am always sure you understand me,
Mr. Scholaro.
You are indefatigable.
And when I've seen my poems (grown
slightly stale and thin)
Laid out as on a smorgasbord—should
I scowl,
Or try to force a grin?

Let me be no clearer

You, Professor, are the eternal humorist,
The eternal enemy of the poem,
Giving my vagrant meanings the drollest twists!

I am dying, Empson, dying—
Dying of exegetical sclerosis;
Done in by criticosis.

III

Yes, I have known them all already,
known them
all (Mistah Kittredge and Mistah Lowes—they dead):—

They are the spade men
They are the source men
The "See my this" and
"See his that" men
Digging together
Bibliographies filled with straw . . .
Multiplying footnotes
In a wilderness of microfilm

What can the professor do?
Suspend his publications, with tenure
Delayed?

HURRY UP PLEASE IT'S TIME

This is the way scholarship ends
This is the way criticism ends
This is the way literature ends
Not with a bang but an *ibid.*

With the smell of smudge pots down
the hall
Burning burning ever burning
O Head pluckest me out

burning

And Old Possum driven by the Trade
(in offprints)
To a peevish corner.

(After looking at a few of Mr. Scholaro's chapters, I decided that if the shaking of the Golden Bough could be stopped, some of the fragments of my verse might be collected; but upon closer examination, I realized that they were clearly beyond shoring up; and all at once it came to me that with one's poetical world in ruins, one must cultivate one's Christmas trees (*The Cultivation of*

Christmas Trees, by T. S. Eliot. 7 pp.
New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy.
\$1.25)

Tenants of the field,
Unholy thoughts in a holy season.

Soybean Lesson

Farmers at the Crossroads, by Ezra Taft Benson (as told to Carlisle Bargeron). 107 pp. New York: Devin-Adair Company. \$2.50

"As ye sow, so shall ye reap," our Secretary of Agriculture, the Bible-knowing Mr. Ezra Taft Benson, loves to quote. His account of how the hodgepodge farm "policy" of the past generation has sown seeds of politics and bureaucracy and has reaped a whirlwind of lost markets, gluts, surplus farmers, and catastrophic waste makes a grim lesson in the fruitlessness of intervention.

Consider the extent of the intervention. The U.S. Government, through thousands of its agents in county seats, buys most of the nation's grain. It lets farmers know how many acres they may plant. It insures crops. It stores crops. It irrigates crops. It sells crops. It exports crops. It gives away crops. It plans and finances soil conservation. While fretting over surpluses, it researches for still greater crop yields. It annually adds vast new acreages of farm land through its giant reclamation program. It eases the tax burden of farmers. It lends money to farmers for equipment, electrification, livestock, planting, seeds, fertilizers and harvesting. It restricts competition—foreign, through tariffs; domestic, through cooperatives and agricultural marketing agreements. It sets prices on certain commodities—for example, fluid milk—and through parity supports it indirectly sets prices on wheat, cotton, corn, tobacco and other so-called "basic" commodities. And it pays farmers money for not growing crops.

book Mr. Benson calls flexible supports and lessened controls "steps in the right direction."

How right this direction can be Mr. Benson demonstrates with the example of uncontrolled soybean production. While a generation of federal controls has almost wrecked the cotton producer, a generation of no such federal controls seems to have been a blessing for soybeans: soybean acreage has increased, in the past twenty-five years, to 19 million acres. While cotton was losing an established export market, soybeans acquired a wide market where none had ever existed and deeply cut into the cotton-seed-meal and cottonseed-oil markets. Soybeans, in short, have thrived on cotton controls.

Mr. Benson's book deserves a serious reading by farm politicians, farm producers and farm consumers. His "right direction" points to the free market.

W. H. PETERSON

True Loyalist

Franco of Spain, by S. F. A. Coles. 264 pp. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press. \$4.00

The Liberals will never forgive General Franco for having stood in the way of Progress. But for him, Russian power would have been established on the Atlantic twenty years ago, and Europe would long since have been crushed into submission to Communism. The Kremlin would have sealed off the Mediterranean at the Straits of Gibraltar, and would not have been put to the expense and trouble of arranging the present crisis at Suez.

Mr. Coles explains carefully and accurately the antecedents and the causes of the Spanish Civil War. He makes it clear, at least to this reviewer, that in 1936 the real loyalists—loyal to their nation and to European civilization—were Franco and his followers. He offers, furthermore, a convincing analysis of the present status of Spain, and of the factors affecting a possible restoration of the monarchy.

For two decades Franco has been the object of a concerted campaign of vilification in our captive press, and even today the propaganda machine uses him as a bogey-man to frighten children. In these circumstances anyone who dares to form his own opinion of Franco is strongly tempted to

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dents add 3% tax.)

Secretary Benson, who does not make the laws but must administer them, is unhappy over the situation. He said so before and during the election campaign. The Democrats wanted high, rigid price supports, but he called for flexible supports. In this

answer slander with encomium, and I am afraid that Mr. Coles has here and there yielded to the temptation. I suspect that Franco as a man may be not quite so perspicacious, not quite so noble as he appears to Mr. Coles, and that his greatness may be somewhat exaggerated by contrast with the Liberal midgets who perform in many European governments. But I remind myself that Mr. Coles knows the General personally, and that I do not.

REVILO OLIVER

Flight into Life

The Walls Came Tumbling Down, by Henriette Roosenburg. 248 pp. New York: The Viking Press. \$3.50

It is now more than eleven years since a young Dutch girl, aptly called Zip, and three of her compatriots were released from their Nazi prison. They discovered they were in Waldheim, somewhere near the Polish border. Hitler was dead, the Nazis routed, and Russians were pouring in. The surrounding countryside lay under total anarchy. Roads were blocked, bridges were down, and personal identity was meaningless. Murder and rape were threats to anyone who dared to travel.

But the pear trees were in bloom and bodily freedom was intoxicating. With her companions, Zip began an odyssey as heroic as Ulysses'. Though barely strong enough to walk, they started up the road, northwards, toward Holland. When they reached the Elbe, they found a boat; and for a month they sailed downstream, past sentries, wreckage, a whole world in collapse, until they came to the U.S. lines and were flown home.

The original settlers in the United States were refugees, of course; and after the Civil War, at least in the South, there were people whose lives faced these same extremities. Otherwise, for a full century, most of us have only heard about human tribulation. Even today, as thousands of Hungarians are arriving in our midst, we are only well-meaning spectators. Reading Miss Roosenburg's story, I wonder if someone like myself, whose civil existence has never been threatened by anything more horrific than a television commercial, was altogether the luckier. Few of us ever

deliberately chose extremity; but to have had it thrust upon one, and to have felt one's adrenalin involuntarily flow, is not entirely an adversity. It awakens a relish, an unashamed lust for being alive, of which Zip's book assures me she will know the tingle forever.

ROBERT PHELPS

The Morals of Jazz

The Heart of Jazz, by William L. Grossman and Jack W. Farrell. 315 pp. New York: New York University Press. \$6.50

Guide to Jazz, by Hugues Panassié and Madeleine Gautier. Translated by Desmond Flower. Edited by A. A. Guowitch. 312 pp. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. \$4.00

Jazz might be viewed as a microscopic reflection of America itself. It is a new force of tremendous vitality and impact. But the first principles of jazz were soon forgotten, novelty was confused with progress, to the point where today's jazzmen, ignorant of direction and even history, present a Babel of voices.

This is the basic premise of Messrs. Grossman and Farrell. They are not the first, of course, to believe that jazz has been crippled by Modernism. But they might be first, in this book, to invite critics to stop treating jazz as a sanctuary for *aficionados*. They go so far as to suggest that one might even explore the moral effect of jazz.

The authors believe, of course, that jazz has merit. Mr. Grossman, a New York University commerce professor, digs quite deeply into theory, yet at times he trips into hurried superficiality, as in his discussion of Christian influences in jazz. Mr. Farrell, a musician who has studied jazz closely over a long period, comments on jazz practice. Both authors will be called, by moderns, "moldy figs"; i.e., they dig traditional jazz the most. But whatever its faults, this book, to be refuted, will require more thought than jazz fans are accustomed to.

Mr. Panassié is the man who, reputedly, introduced jazz to Europe. Were it not for this reputation, his books would not be published. This "Guide," certainly, is no more than a guide to the irrelevant prejudices of Mr. Panassié.

J. P. MCFADDEN

Polemical Textbook

Legislation, Cases and Materials, by Stanley S. Surrey and Frank C. Newman. 712 pp. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. \$9.50

Purportedly a legal textbook dealing with the lawyer's role in the legislative process and the drafting of statutes, this volume is in fact an unabashed attempt to influence the law student's political opinions. Congressional committees investigating Communism, it insists, are at best ridiculous and at worst—that is, right now—a threat to the freedom of the American citizen.

Of 635 pages devoted to the lawyer's role in the legislative process, almost half are devoted expressly to congressional investigations, surely a small part of the problem, and the remainder are liberally sprinkled with anti-congressional-investigation innuendoes. The authors were able to find space, moreover, for a Herblock cartoon in which a car labeled "Committee on Un-American Activities" careens down a sidewalk, running over pedestrians, as its driver and passenger reassuringly shout "It's Okay—We're Hunting Communists"; and for a long letter by Ben Margolis justifying his contumacious actions before a congressional committee. (Margolis is a California lawyer who pleaded the Fifth Amendment.)

All this is the more shocking in view of the excellence of certain chapters in which the authors desert polemics for scholarship. And the sections on drafting and interpreting statutes should be helpful to all law students.

One of the authors' purposes is to persuade their readers that those who plead the Fifth Amendment in response to questions about Communist membership are not to be presumed Communists. As one would expect, therefore, they fix attention on Senator Joseph McCarthy as epitomizing the evils of congressional investigating committees, and come down hard on the McCarthy-Zwicker exchange without, however, mentioning the incidents that precipitated McCarthy's actions.

This reviewer predicts for the book a huge sale out among the nation's numerous Liberal-dominated law schools.

VAN GALBRAITH

To the Editor

Radio Free Europe

Permit me to register dissent from your editorial call for a "congressional study" of Radio Free Europe. It simply isn't true that its operations "have been shrouded in secrecy." The RFE record, including all the scripts in all languages, are wide open to the public. There is nothing to stop any publication, including NATIONAL REVIEW, from making its own "study."

Had the Hungarian rebellion been successful, RFE would have been loaded with laurels for its long-term job of keeping the satellite peoples apprised of the existence and the sympathies of the free world. The rebellion having been crushed—partly at least because of the passivity of the free world—there is a natural search for scapegoats, and RFE is under attack. But the notion that the uprising was "provoked" by radio is nonsensical, except in the sense that the awareness of freedom beyond the Iron Curtain is a standing provocation.

It would be exceedingly sad if the frustration over the Hungarian tragedy should result in reducing or closing down entirely the few channels of free communication with the humanity in the Soviet sphere now available.

Pleasantville, N.Y. EUGENE LYONS

A Slight Difference of Opinion

Congratulations, and very warm ones, upon successfully completing your first year with NATIONAL REVIEW! It is an exceedingly fine publication and, judging from the jibes and jabs at you from the "liberal" sheets, has already made its influence felt.

Mill Valley, Cal. DAVID W. RYDER

... NATIONAL REVIEW, say the letter writers, is "simply tops." It is "factual, interesting, informative." It has "conspicuous courage." It provides the "best in reading." It is "one of the most welcome manifestations of the fact that the 'fourth estate' is still functioning in this country." Some letter writers comment favorably on the wit of some contributors.

Then I wonder why I miss all these good things, for I find NATIONAL REVIEW dull, labored, obscure, conceited and frequently atrociously written....

Salt Lake City, Utah THEODORE LONG

... you have performed a truly great work during your initial year. The response you have already received bespeaks a real awakening of the true spirit of America to the voices of freedom and independence based on self-reliance and private initiative graced with human dignity.

La Canada, Cal. H. CLAUDE LEWIS

Envy and the Professor

Corking "Ivory Tower" in December 15, especially the references to "mean-spirited envy and spite," which often are shown by professors of cultural humanities!

New York City PHILIP McDONALD

Not "Awesome" to Conservatives

It has been reported several times lately that the President is out of patience with the Twenty-second Amendment which limits his tenure of the Presidency to two terms. If this is true it would appear that he is rapidly developing a malady more serious than a heart attack or ileitis—an indispensability complex. That would be wholly the fault of the great number of election analysts who have attributed his victory to "an almost awesome popularity," as one scribe put it, and to those intimate advisers who have persuaded him that his soft-boiled Republicanism enjoys mass approval within the party and a lot beyond its confines.

This writer, well knowing that Ike was going to win because Stevenson and Kefauver had to lose, has not felt at any time, before or since the election, that either Ike or his so-called program were "awesomely" popular anywhere. The election returns persuaded him that millions of conservatives in both parties, who have little liking and less respect for Ike as President (however much they might

enjoy leaning on his barnyard gate with him to talk of kine and swine) would more honestly have expressed their sentiments if they had turned their backs on the polls. But they got out and voted for Eisenhower, with due distaste, to help fend off the national disaster of a recrudescence of the New Deal, under ADA-Reuther direction and with Stevenson as their obliging custodian of the rubber stamp.

I am fairly confident that this fear of seeing the nation consigned to the care of a limp Stevenson and a clownish Kefauver accounts for most of the heavy Eisenhower vote in the South. There the conservatives had retreated from the radically controlled Democratic Convention in sullen silence. But lots of them had then said to Stevenson and Company at the polls what the parson in an old minstrel show song said to the scamp who volunteered to take up the collection: "Anybody but you!"

Few as my contacts are, I have heard directly and indirectly of a surprising number of sober citizens who plead guilty to voting for Eisenhower in just this spirit and who believe that enough others did the same to account in no small part for the Eisenhower victory "by near acclamation," as another gurgling sycophant has put it. If any great number of sound Americans share this view of the "awesome" popular support which Ike thinks he has for that nebulous program of his, it is about time for some who carry weight to say so. Otherwise we are going to find ourselves politically enmeshed by the White House praetorians in a "cult of personality," as they call it in Moscow, as un-American as the disastrous Roosevelt cult.

Bernardsville, N.J. HEPTISAX

Quid Pro Quo

If America is going to pick up the tab again for Egypt, Britain, France, Israel and the UN at Suez, why not get a little something for our money this time? The Lord knows we don't want their food, their clothes, or their territory. By this time we may have learned that we cannot buy their love.

So let's buy their adherence to our foreign policy. I wonder, Mr. Editor, if you know what it is?

New York City ALFRED KOHLBERG

Great Expectations for Al Capp

... after reading Mr. Schlamm's piece on Al Capp [December 1], I can be silent no longer and only hope that it is not presumptuous to assume that praise, even from a humble source, is not unwelcome.

The failure of "L'il Abner" to please the critics is an unexpected bit of justice . . . But surely enlarged fields of success can and will be found as they were for E. R. Murrow, who proved himself a man of no mean ability on "This I Believe"—finding about four successful men in as many years who believed in any recognizable God.

Though justice is rare in today's Liberal society, mercy continues to be meted out with solid regularity. Every week out comes NATIONAL REVIEW to ward off complete despair.

Manhasset, N.Y.

ELIZABETH MURPHY

The State of Israel

For some time I have been receiving NATIONAL REVIEW, and I agree with many articles appearing in the journal. There is, however, one feature of the journal which I completely fail to comprehend. It is incomprehensible to me that the authors who touch on that subject are so unqualifiedly opposed to the State of Israel.

No reasons why that stand is taken are given; mere antipathies are voiced. For I cannot call reasons such arguments as are based on gross factual error, or on complete non-comprehension of the things which matter. I am, therefore, tempted to believe that the authors in question are driven by an anti-Jewish animus; but I have learned to resist temptations. I taught at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem for the whole academic year of 1954-1955, and what I am going to say is based exclusively on what I have seen with my own eyes.

The first thing which strikes one in Israel is that the country is a Western country, which educates its many immigrants from the East in the ways of the West: Israel is the only country which as a country is an outpost of the West in the East. Furthermore, Israel is a country which is surrounded by mortal enemies of overwhelming numerical superiority, and in which a single book absolutely predominates in the instruction given

in elementary schools and in high schools: the Hebrew Bible. Whatever the failings of individuals may be, the spirit of the country as a whole can justly be described in these terms: heroic austerity supported by the nearness of biblical antiquity. A conservative, I take it, is a man who believes that "everything good is heritage." I know of no country today in which this belief is stronger and less lethargic than in Israel.

But the country is poor, lacks oil and many other things which fetch much money; the venture on which the country rests may well appear to be quixotic; the university and the government buildings are within easy range of Jordanian guns; the possibility of disastrous defeat or failure is obvious and always close. A conservative, I take it, is a man who despises vulgarity; but the argument which is concerned exclusively with calculations of success, and is based on blindness to the nobility of the effort, is vulgar.

I hear the argument that the country is run by labor unions. I believe that it is a gross exaggeration to say that the country is run by the labor unions. But even if it were true, a conservative, I take it, is a man who knows that the same arrangement may have very different meanings in different circumstances.

The men who are governing Israel at present came from Russia at the beginning of the century. They are much more properly described as pioneers than as labor unionists. They were the men who laid the foundations under hopelessly difficult conditions. They are justly looked up to by all non-doctrinaires as the natural aristocracy of the country, for the same reasons for which Americans look up to the Pilgrim fathers. They came from Russia, the country of Nicolai the Second and Rasputin; hence they could not have had any experience of constitutional life and of the true liberalism which is only the reverse side of constitutional democracy adorned by an exemplary judiciary.

On Page 16 of the November 17 issue of the REVIEW, Israel is called a racist state. The author does not say what he understands by a "racist state," nor does he offer any proof for the assertion that Israel is a racist state. Would he by any chance have

in mind the fact that in the state of Israel there is no civil marriage, but only Jewish, Christian and Moslem marriages, and therefore that mixed marriages in the non-racist sense of the term are impossible in Israel? I am not so certain that civil marriage is under all circumstances an unmitigated blessing, as to disapprove of this particular feature of the State of Israel.

Finally, I wish to say that the founder of Zionism, Herzl, was fundamentally a conservative man, guided in his Zionism by conservative considerations. The moral spine of the Jews was in danger of being broken by the so-called emancipation which in many cases had alienated them from their heritage, and yet not given them anything more than merely formal equality; it had brought about a condition which has been called "external freedom and inner servitude"; political Zionism was the attempt to restore that inner freedom, that simple dignity, of which only people who remember their heritage and are loyal to their fate, are capable.

Political Zionism is problematic for obvious reasons. But I can never forget what it achieved as a moral force in an era of complete dissolution. It helped to stem the tide of "progressive" levelling of venerable, ancestral differences; it fulfilled a conservative function.

Chicago, Ill.

LEO STRAUSS

Neither True nor False

James Burnham's "Third World War" in the December 1 issue is the most baffling thing I have encountered in reading NATIONAL REVIEW. Is it really a lecture by a real Russian professor [no—J.B.] or is it an ultra-subtle bit of satire? . . . The article certainly ought to help anyone to look at Russia—and ourselves—in a clearer light.

Lewiston, Maine

PAUL WEBSTER

NR on Hungary

. . . It will have to be admitted, the Kremlin brutalities in Hungary have opened many, many eyes to the real cruelty and heartlessness of the Reds, but next to that I believe NATIONAL REVIEW is second in making our citizens aware of the truth.

Belmont, Mass.

WAYLAND MINOT